33 ideas
14480 | Maybe analytic truths do not require truth-makers, as they place no demands on the world [Thomasson] |
13030 | Extensionality: ∀x ∀y (∀z (z ∈ x ↔ z ∈ y) → x = y) [Kunen] |
13032 | Pairing: ∀x ∀y ∃z (x ∈ z ∧ y ∈ z) [Kunen] |
13033 | Union: ∀F ∃A ∀Y ∀x (x ∈ Y ∧ Y ∈ F → x ∈ A) [Kunen] |
13037 | Infinity: ∃x (0 ∈ x ∧ ∀y ∈ x (S(y) ∈ x) [Kunen] |
13038 | Power Set: ∀x ∃y ∀z(z ⊂ x → z ∈ y) [Kunen] |
13034 | Replacement: ∀x∈A ∃!y φ(x,y) → ∃Y ∀X∈A ∃y∈Y φ(x,y) [Kunen] |
13039 | Foundation:∀x(∃y(y∈x) → ∃y(y∈x ∧ ¬∃z(z∈x ∧ z∈y))) [Kunen] |
13036 | Choice: ∀A ∃R (R well-orders A) [Kunen] |
13029 | Set Existence: ∃x (x = x) [Kunen] |
13031 | Comprehension: ∃y ∀x (x ∈ y ↔ x ∈ z ∧ φ) [Kunen] |
13040 | Constructibility: V = L (all sets are constructible) [Kunen] |
14471 | Analytical entailments arise from combinations of meanings and inference rules [Thomasson] |
14493 | Existence might require playing a role in explanation, or in a causal story, or being composed in some way [Thomasson] |
14491 | Rival ontological claims can both be true, if there are analytic relationships between them [Thomasson] |
14489 | Theories do not avoid commitment to entities by avoiding certain terms or concepts [Thomasson] |
14485 | Ordinary objects may be not indispensable, but they are nearly unavoidable [Thomasson] |
14487 | The simple existence conditions for objects are established by our practices, and are met [Thomasson] |
21651 | It is analytic that if simples are arranged chair-wise, then there is a chair [Thomasson, by Hofweber] |
14467 | Ordinary objects are rejected, to avoid contradictions, or for greater economy in thought [Thomasson] |
14479 | To individuate people we need conventions, but conventions are made up by people [Thomasson] |
14486 | Eliminativists haven't found existence conditions for chairs, beyond those of the word 'chair' [Thomasson] |
14481 | Wherever an object exists, there are intrinsic properties instantiating every modal profile [Thomasson] |
14482 | If the statue and the lump are two objects, they require separate properties, so we could add their masses [Thomasson] |
14483 | Given the similarity of statue and lump, what could possibly ground their modal properties? [Thomasson] |
16640 | Form is the principle that connects a thing's constitution (rather than being operative) [Hill,N] |
14476 | Identity claims between objects are only well-formed if the categories are specified [Thomasson] |
14477 | Identical entities must be of the same category, and meet the criteria for the category [Thomasson] |
14478 | Modal Conventionalism says modality is analytic, not intrinsic to the world, and linguistic [Thomasson] |
14466 | A chief task of philosophy is making reflective sense of our common sense worldview [Thomasson] |
14475 | How can causal theories of reference handle nonexistence claims? [Thomasson] |
14474 | Pure causal theories of reference have the 'qua problem', of what sort of things is being referred to [Thomasson] |
14488 | Analyticity is revealed through redundancy, as in 'He bought a house and a building' [Thomasson] |